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Judicial Assistance: Obtaining Evidence in the 
United States, Under 28 u.s.c. § 1782, for Use in a 
Foreign or International Tribunal 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need to obtain evidence available only in the United States, for use In a 
foreign or international tribunal, arises in diverse situations. l Foreign govern-
ments occasionally need such evidence to advance civil or criminal charges2 or to 
conduct investigations in contemplation of legal action.3 Such evidence may be 
important in foreign private litigation. 4 Recent events demonstrate that such 
evidence also might be required by international tribunals with jurisdiction over 
contractual disputes between corporations of one nation and the government of 
another. 5 
Congress has provided a right to gather evidence in the United States for use 
1. A tribunal is a forum of justice composed of a person, or body of persons, having the authority to 
hear and decide disputes so as to bind the disputants. WEBSTER'S 3RD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (4th ed. 1976). While this definition obviously includes courts, 
it also comprises those bodies which possess some but not all of a court's components. For example, a 
tribunal might, after hearing evidence, exercise a judicial function such as deciding on the evidence 
between a proposal and an opposition; yet the body might not formally be called a "court." Pal, unnamed 
treatise, quoted in In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 
272 F. Supp. 758,761 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). American courts have always construed "tribunal" in the context 
of specific statutes mentioning the word. E.g.; In re Mezzacca, 67 N.J. 387, 389, 340 A. 2d 658, 659 
(1975) (departmental review committee); New York State Labor Relations Board v. Holland Laundry, 
42 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188, 180 Mise. 1031 (1943) (labor relations board); Statev. Peake, 22 N.D. 457, 461, 
135 N .W. 197, 199 (1912) (court martial). See § III. A infra for a discussion of "tribunal" in the context of 
§ 1782. 
2. E.g., In re Letters Rogatory from the 9th Criminal Division, Regional Court. Manheim Federal 
Republic of Germany, 448 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978). 
3. E.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 272 
F. Supp. 758 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967). 
4. E.g., In the Court of the Commissioner for the Republic of South Africa, No. 80-591, slip op. 
(D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1980). 
5. Iran and the United States, for example, recently established the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal for adjudication of certain claims involving those governments and their nationals. The 
Algerian Declarations: Settlement of Claims, art. II, reprinted in The New York Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A4, 
col. 5. For the purpose of the Algerian declarations. "national" means a corporation or other legal entity 
established under the laws of either nation, as well as a natural person who is a citizen. Id. art. VII. The 
Claims Tribunal must conduct business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL). /d. art. III. These rules provide that the 
Claims Tribunal may require a party to produce "documents, exhibits or other evidence" pertinent to 
the claim being presented. Text: The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) art. 24, reprinted in 27 Alii. J. 
COMPo L. 489 (1979). No provisions exist for the likely situation, however, where a party needs to 
compel a non-party witness to give evidence for presentation to the tribunal. 
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II1 a f()reign or international tribunal in 28 u.s.c. § 1782.6 The liberality of 
Section 1782 procedures allows foreign courts to obtain evidence in the United 
States with greater ease than an American court can obtain evidence in foreign 
jurisdictions. 7 The difference in procedures is particularly acute when the nation 
in which the evidence is sought has a civil legal system.s In 1964, the United 
6. The significant increase of international transactions during this century has had the inevitable 
result of increasing the incidence of international litigation. In 1958, Congress created the Commission 
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure to study the "existing practices of judicial assistance and 
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements." 
Act of Sept. 2, 1958, PUB. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743. In a 1963 bill, the Commission proposed to 
"improve judicial procedures in serving documents, obtaining evidence and proving documents in 
litigation with international aspects." H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963). The Judiciary 
Committees of both houses of Congress adopted the bill without amendment during the next session. 
S. REp. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3782 [hereinafter 
cited as U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS]. Section 1782 provides as follows: 
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to 
give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a letter 
rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application 
of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the 
document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his 
appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take the 
testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in 
whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, 
for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent 
that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the 
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document 
or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege. 
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily giving 
his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other thing, for use in a preceeding in 
a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him. 
28 U .S.C. § 1782 (1964). 
7. In 1939, one international practitioner stated that "[t]he difficulties surrounding the securing of 
evidence abroad are such as to confound any general practitioner not experienced in such matters. 
Even to one who has the necessary experience, the delays and red tape involved in an effort to secure 
such evidence create a formidable psychological barrier in the prosecution of a litigation." Heilpern, 
Procuring Evidence Abroad, 14 TvL. L. REV. 29 (1939). This condition, which still exists today, has been as 
much due to delays encountered in using the required diplomatic channels as to the failure of various 
nations' governments to reach agreement on the subject by treaty. Applications for the execution of 
letters rogatory have been known to require up to two years before their return to the requesting party. 
The application sometimes must pass through a dozen or more government offices on its way to the 
foreign court and back, and there is an opportunity for loss or delay at each stop. Jones, International 
Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. SIS, 529-30 (1953) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Jones]. Furthermore, treaties to which the United States has been a signatory have either 
failed to clarify the procedure for obtaining assistance in evidence-taking or have not been followed for 
a variety of reasons. See generally Jones, supra, at 519-34. The Hague Convention, infra note 24, has 
overcome most, but not all, of these difficulties. For a discussion of letters rogatory and their proce-
dures. see notes 19-29 and accompanying text infra. 
8. Although civil legal practice varies from nation to nation, basic procedural differences exist 
between civil and common legal systems. The civil system is generally inquisitorial in nature, in contrast 
to the common law system, which is adversarial. Jones, supra note 7, at 531. Compare C. PRo elV., tit. VII 
(French) (Judicial Administration of Evidence) with FED. R. CIV. PRo 26-37 (the former grants its judges 
broad and exclusive powers in evidence-gathering, while the latter assigns the duty of examining 
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States Congress, recogmzmg a need for better international cooperation in 
litigation, liberalized Section 1782 by amendment.9 By improving the U.S. statu-
tory scheme of international judicial assistance, Congress hoped to bring the 
United States "to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of 
sister nations."Io Congress hopes that this initiative would "invite foreign coun-
tries similarly to adjust their procedures."ll 
This Comment examines the procedures of Section 1782, its liberalizing as-
pects, and its limits. The discussion of procedure focuses on obtaining evidence 
through voluntary, as opposed to compulsory, discovery. The author also 
discusses alternative approaches available for judicial assistance. 
witnesses to the parties and their counsel). The French Civil Code requires, if the subject matter of the 
action exceeds fifty French francs, that evidence be submitted only in written form. C. civ. art. 1341 
(Fr.). Only where a judge finds this evidence to be inconclusive may the parties produce oral testimony. 
Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United 
States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 36 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Borel]. Only a judge may order such 
types of examination as the inspection of a site, the testing of physical evidence, and the oral examma-
tion of parties and non-parties. [d. The judge, rather than counsel, interrogates witnesses. Oaths are 
administered, if at all, only in judicial proceedings. jones, supra note 7, at 527-28. Counsel who attempt 
to address witnesses directly or to influence them may be excluded from court. C. PRo CIV. art. 214 (Fr.). 
The civil system's reliance upon the judge to perform procedural acts is the result of higher expecta-
tions for a judge'S work and a desire for some guarantee of the authentiCIty and veracity of evidence. 
I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION PRACTICE MANUAL § 3-12.9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
PRACTICE MANUAL]. 
Common legal systems, in contrast, impose more rigid rules of procedure and notice upon the 
parties, instead of entrusting discovery to the judge. [d. Since the civil law judge'S knowledge of a case, 
under a request for international judicial assistance, may be confined to the limited description of the 
letter rogatory, his examination "may seem vague and perfunctory when issues are complicated or the 
witness hostile or reluctant." jones, supra note 7, at 531. In civil law proceedings, the judge summarizes 
the oral evidence and dictates it to a clerk. The court does not produce a verbatim transcript. The clerk 
then reads the summary to the witness for approval. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 160 (W. Ger.), cited in 
id. The result is that oral examination carried out under a civil law system is often inadequate for use in 
a common law proceeding. !d. 
Under the French Code of Civil Procedure, no procedure exists for obtaining evidence prior to the 
commencement of an action. Written evidence is gathered before trial, but other kinds of evidence are 
gathered during trial. Borel, supra, at 43. Civil legal systems do not recognize the common law notion of 
discovery and trial as separate entities, the former a preparation for the latter. jones, supra note 7, at 
528. Many civil law practitioners mistakenly believe that the common law permits the use of pre-trial 
discovery devices prior to the institution of a lawsuit. Borel, supra, at 43. Due to this assumption, France 
has declared that it will not honor requests by other nations for the pre-trial discovery of documents. 
Hague Convention, infra note 24, art. 23, Declarations of France. Although common legal practitioners 
may not "go on a broad fishing expedition, to determine whether there might be some evidence 
somewhere which would support a lawsuit," overly-broad discovery requests by American attorneys 
have not helped to alter this mistaken attitude. Report of the United States Delegation to the Special 
Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 18 March, 1970, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1417, 
1421-24 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Report on the Convention]. Certain civil law practitioners have agreed 
to urge their governments to reconsider this refusal to allow the pre-trial discovery of documents under 
the Hague Convention. [d. at 1424. 
9. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3783. For a discussion of the specific changes 
effected by the 1964 amendment, see § III infra. For the text of the 1964 amendment, see note 6 supra. 
10. U.S. CODE CONGo AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3783. 
11. [d. 
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Congress liberalized Section 1782 by designating a wide range of foreign 
proceedings as eligible for judicial assistance with respect to discovery. Congress 
also granted wide discretion to the judiciary both in rendering such requested 
assistance and in allowing the use of foreign procedures in the evidence-
gathering process. Although neither of these areas of liberalization is without 
limits, this Comment demonstrates that Congress intended to further reduce the 
potential overuse and abuse of Section 1782 by greatly expanding the privileges 
which a hostile witness may assert. 
II. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF SECTION 1782 
Section 1782(b) provides that a person who voluntarily agrees to give evidence 
may do so "before any person and in any manner acceptable to [the witness]."12 
This subsection serves two purposes: (1) it stresses to foreign nations the free-
dom that the United States affords voluntary evidence-taking, and (2) it keeps 
such voluntary procedures intactY A foreign litigant may, therefore, obtain 
evidence in the United States in a manner convenient to the witness and also 
acceptable to the foreign tribunal. In contrast, an attorney who obtains evidence 
through by-passing the judiciary in a civil law jurisdiction risks criminal sanctions 
even when a witness provides evidence voluntarily.14 
The procedures of Section 1782 apply only when an individual possessing 
sought-after evidence is uncooperative. If a witness in the United States refuses 
to provide evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal, the party 
seeking the evidence must obtain an order from the appropriate U.S. district 
court compelling cooperation!5 Only a "foreign or international tribunal" or an 
"interested person" has standing to request such an order. 16 The phrase "in-
terested person," refers both to persons designated under foreign law to seek the 
evidence and to parties to foreign or international litigation! 7 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b). 
13. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3790. 
14. Such a by-passing may be interpreted, in civil law nations, as a usurpation of the sovereignty 
bestowed upon their judiciaries. See note 8 supra. For example, article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code 
provides in part that: 
Whoever, on Swiss territory, without being authorized so to do, takes on behalf of a foreign 
government any action which is solely within the province of a [Swiss] government authority or 
a [Swiss] government official, whoever does anything to encourage such action, ... shall be 
punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the penitentiary. 
STgb, C.P., COD. PEN. 271, quoted in Jones, supra note 7, at 520 n.12. Article 258 of the French Penal 
Code similarly imposes a prison sentence for one who, "without lawful authority, interferes with public, 
civil or military functions." Borel, supra note 8, at 45. 
15. Subject-matter jurisdiction for § 1782 actions is placed in the United States district courts. 28 
U.S.C. § 1782. Venue lies in the district court "of the district in which [the witness] resides or is found." 
[d. 
16. [d. See note I supra for a general explanation of the term "tribunal." For a discussion of its 
construction within the context of § 1782, see § Ill. A supra. 
17. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3789. 
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An "interested person" must apply directly to the court for an order. 1M Tri-
bunals, however, may make requests by way of the historically recognized 
method of the letter rogatory.19 A letter rogatory may reach a U.S. court by one 
of three different routes. Two of those routes are through government channels 
and one is by a request directly to the court.20 
The first government channel for the transmission of letters rogatory to an 
American court is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(l) (1964) (Transmittal of 
letter rogatory or request). Pursuant to that section, a foreign or international 
tribunal can transmit a letter rogatory to the Department of State which in turn 
has power to receive the letter, to transmit it to the requested court and to return 
it to the initiating tribunal after its execution.21 Due to delays encountered in the 
transmission ofletters rogatory, such as those resulting from the awkwardness of 
diplomatic channels22 and from the conflicts inherent in different legal sys-
tems,23 the United States and several other nations developed a second govern-
ment channel. This system was embodied in the Hague Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.24 The Hague 
18. 28 U .S.c. § 1782. 
19. Letters rogatory are the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking through one of 
its courts, requests another country, acting through it own courts and by methods of court 
procedure thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice 
in the former country; such request being made, and being usually granted, by reason of 
comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times. 
The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (D. La. 1941). Judicial comity is a principle in accordance with which 
the courts of one jurisdiction give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of 
obligation but out of deference and respect. E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895). Since 
foreign laws are recognized as a favor or out of courtesy, and not as a matter of right, comity is not an 
imperative rule of law; it may persuade but not command. E.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 
373 (1980). 
The letter rogatory should not be confused with the "deposition." provided for in the Federal Rules, 
under which testimony may be taken in a foreign nation. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b). A deposition may be 
taken in two ways: (I) "On notice," where the witness is served with a written notice that he is to be 
deposed by someone authorized to take oaths; and (2) "By commission," where the American court 
commissions someone to administer the oath and to take the testimony. ld. Depositions of witnesses in 
foreign countries proceed under United States law, since the Federal Rules provide for a by-pass of the 
foreign judiciary. Letters rogatory, in contrast, are submitted for approval and execution to the foreign 
court and are carried out under the procedure ordered by the foreign court.ld. Letters rogatory are the 
required medium where a witness must be compelled to produce evidence or if the law of the foreign 
nation mandates gaining the judiciary'S approval before any evidence-taking may commence. See note 
14 sUjJra. 
20. The foreign or international tribunal may also transmit its request directly to a U.S. court and 
that the latter court may then return it in the same manner. 28 U.S.C. § 1781(b). 
21. Prior to 1972, this was the only government channel available. In practice, requests made 
through the State Department are referred to the Department of Justice for execution. See PRACTICE 
MANUAL,sujJra note 8 at § 3-12.19, 56-57. The Justice Department subjects all such foreign requests to a 
screening and approval process before executing them. ld. 
22. See note 7 sujJra. 
23. See note 8 sujJra. 
24. 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 17BI (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Hague Convention]. The draft of the Hague Convention was completed at the Hague on March lB. 
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Convention solved the delay problem by allowing states that seek evidence to 
by-pass diplomatic channels. Under the Hague Convention each contracting 
state designates a "central authority" to receive letters rogatory and transmit 
them to an appropriate court. 25 Since the Hague Convention provides for the 
avoidance of diplomatic channels and requires that requests made under its 
auspices be executed as the result of a treaty obligation, tribunals of its signatory 
nations should, where possible, transmit their letters rogatory under the Hague 
Convention. 26 However, Section 1782 is applicable wherever evidence is sought 
in the United States for use in a foreign or international tribunal, whether or not 
the request is made under the Hague Convention.27 
1970. It was opened for signature on June I, 1970 and the United States signed it on July 27 of that 
year. It entered into force in the United States on October 7, 1972. Hague Convention, supra. 
25. [d. art. 2. In the United States, this designated authority is the Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. 28 C.F.R. § 0.49 (1973). (This by-pass of 
channels is an improvement for American courts seeking evidence in civil law nations.) See notes 7-8 and 
accompanying text supra. Other such improvements exist in revisions to the French Code of Civil 
Procedure since the Hague Convention's enactment. France now allows verbatim transcripts to be made 
of testimony and allows the use of foreign evidence-taking procedures. The French judge may now 
authorize the interrogation of the witness by the parties or their counsel. C. PRo CIV. arts. 739-40 (Fr.), 
cited in Borel, supra note 8, at 39. Civil law jurisdictions still do not apply compulsory measures to certain 
witnesses, nor do they allow the pre-trial discovery of documents. The system is also still complicated by 
the need to resort to the judiciary, even when a witness would volunteer evidence. See generally Borel, 
supra note 8; Report on the Convention, supra note 8. 
On the other hand, the Hague Convention has not been especially helpful to foreign courts seeking 
evidence in the United States. Section 1782, as amended six years prior to the creation of the Hague 
Convention, already contained all of the advantages which the latter provided, in addition to broader 
standing rules. 28 U.S.c. § 1782 (1964). See note 27 infra, for a comparison of § 1782 with the Hague 
Convention. 
26. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, at 56-57. Signatory nations which have ratified the Hague 
Covention include Denmark, France, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Eighteen other signatory nations have not yet ratified. 
Signatory nations may by-pass the Department of Justice if they wish. Hague Convention, supra note 
24, art. 18, Declarations of U.S. However, government channels may not be by-passed under the Hague 
Convention in other nations unless they have declared that a by-pass is permissible. [d. 
Tribunals may not make requests for judicial assistance under the Hague Convention where the 
matter in question is criminal. The treaty is limited to "civil or commercial matters," a phrase which is 
not defined therein. [d. preamble, art. I. The Department of Justice interprets the phrase liberally, so 
that any non-criminal matter may support a request under the Hague Convention. Report on the 
Convention, supra note 8, at 1418. Consequently, both non-signatory and signatory nations dealing with a 
criminal matter must either go through the State Department or apply directly to a U.S. court. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1781 (1964). 
27. The Department of Justice executes all letters rogatory forwarded through government chan-
nels, whether sent to it directly or through the Department of State regardless of whether the Hague 
Convention applies. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 3-12.19,56-57. When a witness declines to 
cooperate, the Department of Justice will make an application for an order under § 1782. [d. at 61. 
The Hague Convention and § 1782 are similar in scope. Both allow a United States court to render 
assistance to a foreign judicial authority in response to a letter rogatory. Hague Convention, supra note 
24, art. I; 28 U.s.C. § 1782. Both permit that the evidence-gathering procedure be dictated by either 
American or the applicable foreign law. Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 9; 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Both 
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Few formalities are applicable to a letter rogatory directed to a U.S. court.28 
The letter should be accompanied by an English translation when necessary. The 
usual practice for the filing of these letters is ex parte.29 
II I. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF SECTION 1782 
The present Section 1782, as amended in 1964, is the most recent in a long line 
of predecessor statutes. 30 A comparison of the different versions of Section 1782 
shows that a number of amendments facilitated foreign access to evidence-taking 
in the United States. These changes also set new limits by which foreign courts 
may prevent the overuse and abuse of discovery. 
A. Foreign Proceedings 
Section 1782 limits the court's authority to grant assistance in evidence-taking. 
The statute formerly permitted assistance by the courts only where the evidence 
was for use in a "judicial proceeding" pending in a foreign court. 31 The present 
give the witness the right to asser! any privilege, applicable under either American or foreign law, in an 
attempt to quash an order to give evidence. Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 11; 28 U.S.c. § 1782. 
The mechanisms differ, however, when standing is concerned. The Hague Convention states that 
only 'Judicial authorit[ies]" have standing to request assistance, Hague Convention, supra- note 24, art. 1, 
while § 1782 permits a wider range of persons and entities to make requests. See notes 16-17 and 
accompanying text supra. 
28. Considerable ignorance exists in the United States regarding letters rogatory. jones, supra note 7, 
at 519 n.11. Civil law nations, on the other hand, originated the use of letters rogatory and consequently 
have refined the technique. Union Square Bank v. Reichmann, 41 N.Y.S. 602, 605, 9 A.D. 596 (1896). 
While common law courts still consider letters rogatory solely a means of securing evidence, civil law 
courts use them for almost any kind of judicial act. jones, supra note 7, at 543. 
For forms of motions requesting and orders directing the issuance of letters rogatory as well as actual 
letters rogatory, see 3A WEST'S FEDERAL FORMS §§ 3312-16 (3d ed. 1977); 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S MANUAL 
§§ 15:24.1,25 (2d ed. 1980). The Hague Convention conveniently lists the items that should be included 
in a letter rogatory. Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 3. 
29. E.g., In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo, japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
30. The 1948 version of Section 1782 provided: 
The deposition of any witness residing in the United States to be used in any civil action 
pending in any court in a foreign country with which the United States is at peace may be taken 
before a person authorized to administer oaths designated by the district court of any district 
where the witness resides or may be found. 
The practice and procedure in taking such deposition shall conform generally to the practice 
and procedure for taking depositions to be used in courts of the United States. 
Act of june 25, 1948, ch. 117, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (1948). 
The 1949 amendment struck the word "residing" from the statute and replaced the words "civil 
action" with 'Judicial proceeding." Act of May 24,1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949). For the text 
of the most current amendment (1964), see note 6 supra. For an appendix of prior versions to § 1782, 
see In re Letters Rogatory from the justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562, 566-69 
(6th Cir. 1975). 
31. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949); see also note 30 supra. 
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statute permits assistance where the evidence is for use in a "proceeding in a 
foreign or international tribunaL"32 Thus, under the current language, the 
proceeding need not be judicial or be pending in a foreign court, but merely 
must occur before a "tribunaL"33 
I. Congress' Explanation of "Tribunal" 
Congress used the term "tribunal" in order "to make it clear that assistance is 
not confined to proceedings before conventional courtS."34 A Congressional 
report states, for example, that Section 1782 applies to the taking of evidence 
intended for use in proceedings "pending before investigating magistrates in 
f()reign countries.":15 The use of the phrase "investigating magistrates" broadens 
Section 1782's scope to encom pass proceedings before the Frenchjuge d'instruc-
tion within the meaning of "tribunaL":16 A juge d'instruction is a legal practitioner 
with a status that is judicial in nature.:lI This official, unique to the civil law 
32. 28 U .S.C. § 1782. 
33. For the common definition of "tribunal," see note I supra. 
34. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3788. Several congressional references to 
"litigation," however, clearly demonstrate that Congress intended § 1782 assistance to be granted by 
courts only f(,r investigations related to judicial or quasi-judicial controversies. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS, supra note 6, at 3783; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1962); In re Letters of Request to 
Examine Witnesses from the Cotlrt of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal. 
1973), aff'd per curiam, 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973) (Canadian Commission of Public Inquiry, created by 
the Canadian legislature to investigate all aspects of the Pas Forestry and Industrial Complex Project, 
held not to be a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782). 
Furthermore, the fact that a foreign proceeding deals with a criminal subject matter does not 
preclude its being a tribunal. Congress did not permit a court to grant § 1782 assistance in criminal 
matters prior to 1949; the 1948 version of the statute expressly limited such assistance to "civil 
action(s)." See note 30 supra. All U.S. courts deciding the issue based upon § 1782's 1964 amendment 
have since held that § 1782 assistance may be granted in the case of foreign criminal actions. E.g., In re 
Request for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp. 109, 
112-13 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afI'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977). The latter result is supported by 
congressional intent. In a discussion of the procedural aspects of § 1782, Congress formulated rules 
which apply "irrespective of whether the foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a 
criminal, civil, administrative, or other nature." U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3789 
(emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 3788. 
36. The quoted committee report refers to a 1956 speech in which it was noted that approximately 
half of the letters rogatory received by the French consulate in New York issued fromjuges d'instruction. 
In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 385 F.2d 10 17, 
1020 (2d Cir. 1967). Although these requests were often enforced by U.S. courts, the courts probably 
should not have granted such assistance under the former version of § 1782, which allowed 
assistance only where the evidence was for use in a '~judicial proceeding." [d. 
37. Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM . .J. COMPo L. 441 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Anton]: 
It is not merely that the legislature confides in him exceptional powers in matters concerning 
the individual liberty of citizens, but that it is perfectly clear that the worth and industry of this 
magistrate determine the efficacy of the whole process of penal justice. If it is the jurisdictions 
of judgment which defmitively decide the lot of persons accused, it belongs to the juge 
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system, conducts criminal investigations.:lH He has the dual purpose of assem-
bling the elements of proof against an accused person and of protecting the 
accused's right against false accusation.:l9 The juge d'instruction represents the 
interest of neither the police nor the state prosecutor. His duty is simply to 
ensure that justice is done. 1o The juge d'instruction enters the case only at the 
request of either the civil law counterpart of the district attorneyH or the injured 
party.42 He cannot initiate proceedings of his own accord. 43 Once the juge 
d'instru£'lion enters the case, he conducts the entire investigation, although he 
may delegate some investigative work to the police. 44 The juge d'instruction 
questions the accused and decides whether to submit the case to the appropriate 
court for trial. 45 
In addition to encompassing juges d'instrurtion, Congress extended Section 
1782 judicial assistance to f()reign "administrative tribunals" and other "quasi-
judicial" bodies.46 However, Congress did not define these latter phrases. Conse-
quently, beyond agreeing that the term "tribunal" includes proceedings before 
juges d'instruction, u.s. courts have failed to clarify the parameters of the term 
under Section 1782. 
2. The Scope of "Tribunal" Under U.S. Case Law 
The Southern District of New York rendered the first judicial interpretation 
of the term "tribunal" under Section 1782 in In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the 
Director 0/ Inspection of the Government 0/ India. 47 In this case, the Indian Director 
of Inspection relied on the 1961 Income Tax Act of the Government of India to 
issue a letter rogatory to the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. This letter requested that the court order representatives of two American 
financial institutions to provide evidence. The Director of Inspection was seeking 
d'instruction to bring together the elements on which their decisions are based. and upon the 
professional qualities of this magistrate there directly depend the revelation of truth and the 
efficient functioning of criminal justice. 
Id. at 456-57 (quoting Instruction Generale prise pour l'application du Code de Procedure Penale, ch. 95). 
38. In France, this type of investigation is called {'instruction criminelle. "It is an extremely patient 
preliminary examination of the evidence, which is sifted and studied, heard and reheard, until as far as 
possible all inconsistencies have been eliminated and until those which have not been eliminated are 
thrown into sharp relief." Id. at 442. 
39. One reason a juge d'instrudion conducts l'instruction criminelle is to protect the a(TllSed from 
overzealous police interrogation. ld. at 441. 
40. Id. at 443. 
41. The title of this counterpart is the procureur. See id. at 444-45. 
42. The injured party is known as the partie civile. See id. 
43. Id. at 445. 
44. Id. at 444, 446. 
45. Id. at 455. 
46. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6. at 3788. 
47. 272 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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evidence concerning an Indian citizen who had been involved in a pending tax 
assessment proceeding under the Income Tax Act before an Income Tax 
Officer. The district court issued an ex parte order and subpoena. The financial 
institutions responded with a motion to vacate the order and quash the sub-
poena. The district court denied the motion, finding that the pending income 
tax proceeding was a "tribunal" within the meaning of Section 1782.48 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this finding on two grounds. 49 
First, the appeals court reasoned that Congress intended to limit the term 
"tribunal" by reference to juges d'instruction. 50 The court compared the juge 
d'instruction to the Anglo-American system's grand jury, finding that both of 
these official bodies decide "whether the evidence against a person accused of a 
major crime is sufficient to require him to stand tria!."51 The juge d'instruction 
represents neither the interests of the state nor of the prosecution and has no 
interest in obtaining a conviction. 
Using that concept, the court defined "tribunal" for purposes of Section 1782 
as any tribunal which primarily has an adjudicative function, separate from the 
state's prosecutorial function. 52 The court then contrasted functions of the juge 
d'instruction with those of the Indian Income Tax officer, who "has the sole 
responsibility for making the government's argument as well as for evaluating 
it." The court found that the latter functioned in a prosecutorial as well as an 
adjudicative role. 5 :J 
The second reason for the court's ruling was similar to the first: tax assessors 
"scarcely [fit] the notion that most American legislators would entertain of what 
constitutes a 'tribunal.' "54 In comparing the Indian Income Tax Officer to an 
IRS agent, the court noted that the law empowered both officials to compel oral 
and written testimony, to swear witnesses and to punish perjury and insulting 
behavior. The court also noted that both have a legal duty to grant a fair hearing. 
However, both officials "remain tax collectors and not adjudicators; they do not 
have, and are not supposed to have, the complete objectivity normally associated 
with a 'tribunal.' "55 The appeals court indicated that a tax court, in contrast to an 
assessor, would be a "tribuna!."56 Presumably the court based its rationale on the 
ability of a tax court to act impartially and to bind the disputants.57 
48. India, 272 F. Supp. at 762. 
49. India, 385 F.2d at 1021-22. 
50. "The [1964] amendment must be interpreted in terms of the mischief it was intended to rectify." 
Id. at 1020. This "mischief' was the granting of assistance, under § 1782, to legal practitioners not 
qualified under the statute. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. Accord Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980). 
51. India, 385 F.2d at 1020. 
52. Id. at 1020-21. 
53. !d. at 1020. 
54. Id. at 1021. 
55. Id. at 1021-22. 
56. Id. at 1021. 
57. For a discussion of the common definition of "tribunal," see note I supra. 
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The result of the Second Circuit's holding, under either theory, is that only 
when the evidence is for use in an adjudicatory proceeding may assistance be 
granted under Section 1782. Conversely, a proceeding conducted by someone 
who represents only one side of a dispute would not qualify to receive Section 
1782 assistance. 58 
The Ninth Circuit ignored the "tribunal" issue in In re Letters Rogatoryfrom the 
Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan. 59 In this case, the Tokyo District Court issued a letter 
rogatory pursuant to a request by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office. 
The Public Prosecutor was seeking information regarding a bribery investiga-
tion.60 Using its discretion under Section 1782,61 the U.S. court granted the 
request for judicial assistance. 62 The court explicitly declined to examine the 
tribunal issue, stating that the issue did not "deserve" the court's concern.63 
However, the first issue for judicial resolution under Section 1782 is whether the 
requested evidence is intended for use in a tribunal.64 Therefore, the court's use 
of its judicial discretion may have been improper. 
If the Tokyo court had considered the India definition of "tribunal,"65 it could 
not have justifiably granted the request for judicial assistance. The evidence 
sought in Tokyo was for use by a public prosecutor in a criminal investigation. 66 
Although the Tokyo District Court, clearly a tribunal, had standing to make the 
request,67 the proper issue for the court was whether the investigative proceed-
ing in which the evidence was to be used was a "tribunal." The Japanese Public 
Prosecutor holds the position of plaintiff-prosecutor in criminal trials; he is an 
58. The court described the juge d'instruction, in part, as "he who decides whethe.· the evidence 
against a person accused of a major crime is sufficient to require him to stand trial." India, 385 F. 2d at 
1020. 
One commentator argues that the India holding excludes even juges d'instruction from the ambit of 
"tribunal." Note,Judicial Assistance for the Foreign "Tribunal," 68 DUKE L.J. 981 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as Judicial Assistance]. In this argument, the juge d'instruction is comparable to a prosecutor. Both conduct 
the investigation of criminal cases, including deciding the type and scope of the investigation.Id. at 989. 
In so doing, the juge d'instruction constructs the dossier upon which is based the decision of whether to 
prosecute the accused. The commentator further argues that the juge d'instrucion does not decide, for 
other than minor crimes, whether the accused will stand trial. Rather, that decision is made by the 
Chambre d'accusation, a higher organ of l'instruction criminelle. "Thus, it can be argued that the juge 
d'instruction, by conducting the investigation and compiling the dossier, constructs the government's case 
against the accused, and that, therefore, his function is basically prosecutorial." Id. 
59. 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976). 
60. Id. at 1217-18. 
61. For a discussion of judicial discretion under § 1782, see § III. B supra. 
62. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219. 
63. Id. 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1782. See also India, 385 F.2d at 1022 (court refused to consider issues bearing on 
judicial discretion in lieu of its holding that Indian income tax assessment proceeding was not a tribunal 
within the meaning of § 1782). 
65. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. 
66. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1217-18. 
67. For a discussion of standing under § 1782, see notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. For a 
discussion of the common definition of "tribunal," see note 1 supra. 
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"agent of government ... and conducts the prosecution on behalf of the 
state."68 Therefore, he does not have primarily adjudicative functions,69 and the 
court should not have granted assistance to him under Section 1782. The 
decisions of the India and Tokyo courts are irreconcilable with respect to the 
"tribunal" issue; the former proposed a definition of "tribunal" which the latter 
failed to apply by granting Section 1782 assistance to a foreign prosecutor. 
Depending upon a court's desire to aid foreign nations under Section 1782, 
either the Second or the Ninth Circuit court results can be justified. 
3. A Further Analysis of the "Tribunal" Issue 
One commentator has stated that the term "tribunal" was selected by Congress 
"deliberately as being both neutral and encompassing."70 According to this view, 
"tribunal" includes "[a]ny person or body exercising adjudicatory power."71 This 
construction would disallow Section 1782 assistance to foreign prosecutors be-
cause prosecutors, rather than adjudicating, represent one side of any dispute, 
i.e., that of the state. 72 However, this construction would be consistent with the 
India approach, which focuses upon the quasi-judicial qualities of the juge d'tn-
struction in defining "tribunal."73 He adjudicates because his "independence and 
impartiality are beyond question."74 If courts limit the scope of the term "tri-
bunal" to proceedings in which such quasi-judicial standards are applied,judicial 
assistance would be eliminated under Section 1782 to foreign prosecutors such as 
that of Tokyo. However, this restricted definition of "tribunal" would still permit 
courts to assist foreign legal practitioners such as the juge d'instruction, which 
Congress unquestionably intended to include within the scope of the term. 75 
Alternatively, a court could reach a conclusion similar to that of the Tokyo court 
by interpreting the words "for use," in Section 1782, to mean "for intended or 
actual use." Municipal law empowers prosecutors to conduct investigations into 
68. S. DANDO. JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82-85 (1965) [hereinafter cited as DANDO). 
69. See id. 
70. Smit,lnternational Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1021 n.36 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as Smit] (Hans Smit served as Reporter to the Commission and Advisory Committee 
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, the drafters of § 1782). 
71. [d. 
72. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra. 
73. See notes 50-58 and accompanying text supra. 
74. Anton, supra note 37, at 443. This is further exemplified by the fact that thejuge d'instruction is 
seized of the facts of a case rather than of a complaint against a particular person. He may formally 
charge any person who his investigation leads him to think may have committed the offense. [d. at 446. 
In all cases, he expresses his findings regarding the propriety of further prosecution in an interlocutory 
order which closes rinstruction criminelle. For minor crimes, this order either closes the case or mandates 
that it be tried. For major crimes, the Chambre d'accusation decides whether to prosecute, this decision 
involving an examination of the regularity with which procedures were carried out by the juge d'instruc-' 
tion. [d. at 455. 
75. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. 
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suspected crimes.'6 Prosecutors can often use a range of compulsory measures 
both before and after the institution of a prosecution. 77 A request for assistance 
made during a foreign prosecution would not present a "for use" problem, since 
a tribunal clearly would be the forum "for use" of the evidence.'s However, in a 
pre-prosecution investigation, no trial has yet begun in which the sought-after 
evidence will, with certainty, be used.'9 By intending to use obtained evidence in 
a future prosecution, individuals conducting such investigations would satisfy 
the alternate "tribunal" criterion. 
The courts face two competing policy concerns when defining the term "tri-
bunal."so First, the court itself has an interest in protecting persons within its 
jurisdiction from undue inconvenience through either abuse or overuse of 
Section 1782 procedures. To reconcile this concern, a narrow judicial interpreta-
tion of the term "tribunal" would be appropriate.81 Secondly, however, the 
courts must recognize the expressed Congressional intent to liberalize Section 
1782 in order to encourage other nations to similarly provide easy access to 
judicial assistance procedures. This perspective would necessitate a broad in-
terpretation of the statute. 82 
The solution to this policy dilemma may be to interpret the term "for use" as 
meaning "for intended or actual use," as suggested above. s3 This "for use" 
approach would permit foreign prosecutors to obtain assistance in gathering 
evidence for criminal prosecutions and pre-prosecution investigations. Although 
this interpretation might enable any foreign citizen to seek evidence under 
Section 1782 prior to the institution of a lawsuit, such persons would be pre-
cluded from receiving Section 1782 assistance. A private party might intend to 
use the evidence in potential litigation. This intention would satisfy the "tri-
bunal" criteria, but the party would not have standing to use Section 1782 unless 
litigation had already commenced. 84 Prosecutors, on the other hand, are "desig-
nated by or under foreign law" to seek evidence for their investigations and, 
76. For example, the Japanese Public Prosecutor "may himself investigate a crime if he deems it 
necessary." KEIJI SOSHO HO. art. 191(1) Oapan); PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE LAW, art. 6, quoted in 
DANDO, supra note 68, at 304 Oapan). 
77. See generally DANDO, supra note 68, at 251-340 Oapan); Krauss, The Reform of Criminal Procedure 
Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 24 JURID. REV. 202 (1979) (W. Ger.); Gorgone. Soviet Criminal 
Procedure Legislntion: A Dissenting Perspective, 28 AM. J. CaMP. L. 577 (1980) (U.S.S.R.). 
78. See In re Letters Rogatory from the 9th Criminal Division, Regional Court, Mannheim Federal 
Republic of Germany, 448 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978). 
79. The bulk of investigation in Japanese criminal cases is carried out prior to the institution of 
prosecution, although the investigation can continue even after the prosecution begins. DANDO, supra 
note 68, at 303. 
80. Judicial Assistance, supra note 58, at 992. 
8l. Id. 
82.Id. 
83. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra. 
84. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. 
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therefore, have standing under Section 1782.85 Furthermore, a prosecutor's 
letter of request is usually issued by his domestic court. 86 A prosecutor may only 
compel the production of evidence, even in his own country, through an order 
issued by that domestic court.87 Thus, U.S. courts could limit Section 1782 
assistance, in the case of private parties, to those with pending actions or with 
court-issued requests.88 The issuing foreign court would retain the power "to 
determine whether or not an investigation is entitled to judicial assistance."89 
B. Judicial Discretion to Execute a Letter Rogatory 
Once the court determines that evidence sought under Section 1782 is for use 
in a foreign or international tribunal, it must decide whether to compel produc-
tion.90 U.S. courts have discretion, under Section 1782, to issue an appropriate 
order.91 The court may refuse to grant judicial assistance or may impose condi-
tions it deems desirable.92 In deciding whether to grant or deny a request, the 
court may consider the "nature and attitudes" of the government of the nation 
from which the request emanates and the "character" of the proceedings in 
which the evidence will be used.93 When the request involves proceedings before 
an international tribunal, the court may also consider the "nature" of that 
tribunal and the "character" of the proceedings.94 A court may grant Section 
1782 assistance only to tribunals of nations with which the United States is at 
peace.95 
Tribunals in civil law nations often request that a magistrate, judge or other 
85.Id. 
86. See Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1218. 
87. E.g., DANDO, supra note 68, at 319. 
88. Private foreign litigants with no court order would derive their standing through being "part[ies] 
to the foreign or international litigation." U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3789. Those 
applicants with a court order would rely on the standing of the issuing court, a tribunal. 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1782. 
89. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219. 
90. E.g., India, 385 F.2d at 1022 (court refused to consider issues bearing on its discretion in lieu of its 
holding that the proceeding involved was not a "tribunal"). 
91. "The district court ... 7l/Ily order" the production of evidence. 28 U .S.C. § 1782(a) (emphasis 
added). 
92. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3788. 
93.Id. 
94. Id. Presumably, U.S. courts should not assist foreign tribunals whose proceedings the court finds 
either objectionable or questionable. 
95. The former version of § 1782 limited assistance to nations "with which the United States [was] at 
peace." 63 Stat. 103, supra note 30. Congress deleted this wording because it became devoid of 
significance due to Congress' grant of discretion, to the judiciary, under the 1964 amendment. Where 
the United States has declared a war, no discretion exists to grant a request. Such a declaration places all 
relations with the enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (1951). U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3789. 
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specifically designated individual take the evidence.96 Under Section 1782, the 
court has discretion to grant this request and to appoint the person selected by 
the foreign tribunal. 97 This court-designated person has the power by virtue of 
his appointment to administer any necessary oaths.9R 
Another feature of Section 178~ is the provision that permits different 
evidence-taking procedures in accordance with civil and other legal systems. 
Civil systems, for example, require the person taking the testimony to interro-
gate the witness and to then dictate his version of the testimony to a clerk.99 The 
U.S. court may, in its discretion, order that discovery be conducted in whole or in 
part according to the proced ure of the foreign or international tribunal. loo If the 
court does not exercise this discretion, the parties must follow the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. IOI 
Few judicial decisions have dealt with the discretionary aspect of Section 1782. 
Rather, the courts have limited the statute by narrowing their definition of the 
term "tribunal."102 The decisions dealing with judicial discretion have focused on 
three issues: the likelihood of future reciprocity from the foreign nation;103 the 
possibility of discovering the evidence in the foreign nation; 104 and the admissi-
bility of the evidence in the courts of the foreign nation. l05 
96. Civil law systems often require that a judge, rather than a party or his counsel, take evidence. See 
note 8 supra. 
97. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3789. 
98. !d. 
99. Smit, supra note 70, at 1028. 
100. 28 U .S.C. § 1782. Under the predecessor to § 1782, the deposition was the only procedural 
device for evidence-taking. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949); see also note 30 supra. 
The enactors of the 1964 amendment recognized that the need for obtaining tangible evidence can be as 
imperative as the need for obtaining oral evidence. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3788. 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 
102. See § Ill. A. 
103. The likelihood of reciprocity was at one time considered, by courts, to be an important factor in 
the decision of whether to execute a letter rogatory. E.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 532-34. Under the 1964 
amendment of § 1782, however, the unwillingness or inability of a foreign nation to reciprocate is not 
determinative of the decision to grant requests. See, e.g., In re Request for Judicial Assistance from 
Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afJ'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977). Congress 
intended that the United States' initiative would encourage reciprocity from other nations. U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3783. 
104. In the Court of the Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, No. 80-591, slip 
op. (D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1980), when the requester's counsel could not demonstrate to the court that the 
sought-after evidence was discoverable under the foreign nation's law, the request was not honored. 
The court suggested, however, that the request might have been granted had counsel instructed the 
court in the applicable foreign law. The court also hinted that it would have approved a request for an 
order directing the witness to deliver the evidence to his South African counsel, where the material 
would fall within the jurisdiction of that nation's court. Id. 
105. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since evidence is discoverable for an 
American grand jury, it should also be discoverable in the preliminary stages of the foreign nation's 
procedure. !d. 
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C. Invoking Privileges to Avoid Providing Evidence 
Although U.S. courts have power to grant a request under Section 1782, their 
freedom in this regard is not absolute. Congress added language to the 1964 
amendment which significantly broadened the privileges a witness may assert in 
order to avoid providing the sought-after evidence. The 1964 amendment to 
Section 1782 provides that the court may not compel a witness to give evidence if 
doing so would violate any privilege to which he is entitled. loa The amendment 
replaced 28 U .S.C. § 1785, which had only provided a privilege against self-
incrimination on examination under letters rogatory.I07 The 1964 amendment 
extended the Fifth Amendment privilege to Section 1782 proceedings beyond 
those conducted pursuant to letters rogatory. lOS 
The amendment also clarified the ambiguous language of Section 1785. On its 
face, the Section 1785 language permitted a witness to invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination if the requested evidence would tend to incriminate 
him under the law of any nation of the world. lo9 Congress resolved this am-
biguity by providing the courts with a "reasonable connection" test to be applied 
in circumstances where the Fifth Amendment is invoked.uo Under this stan-
dard, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not available to a witness absent "at least 
a reasonable connection between the person asked to produce the evidel1ce and 
the state or country under the laws of which he claimed the possibility of 
incrimination."111 Among the factors which the court may consider in determin-
ing the existence of such a connection are nationality, domicile, forum and the 
place where the potentially incriminating events occurred.u 2 The "reasonable 
connection" test is, both on its face and in application, a restatement of the 
"Michigan View."113 This view applies the privilege only when a witness suffers a 
substantial risk of prosecution by the foreign sovereignty under whose law the 
testimony would be incriminating.114 
The court used this standard in In re Letters Rogatory from the 9th Criminal 
106. 28U.S.C.§ 1782. 
107. The specific wording provided: "A witness shall not be required on examination under letters 
rogatory to disclose or produce any evidence tending to incriminate him under the laws of any State or 
Territory of the United States or any foreign state." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 117, § 1785, 62 Stat. 949, 
950 (1948). 
108. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3791-92. In other words, a witness may claim the 
privilege whether his testimony is sought by letter rogatory, letter of request or upon an "application" 
under Section 1782. 28 U .S.c. § 1782. 
109. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3792. 
110. [d. 
Ill. [d. 
112. [d. 
113. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2258 (rev. ed. 1961). 
114. [d. 
1982] OBTAINING EVIDENCE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1782 191 
Division, Regional Court, Mannheim Federal Republic of Germany. 115 In that case, the 
witness claimed the privilege against self~incrimination under both the Fifth 
Amendment and the German Code of Civil Procedure. 116 The witness had 
already been cOlH'icted in the United States on numerous counts resulting from 
his fraudulent sale of worthless securities in Germany.117 A criminal court in 
Germany sought the answers to questions pertinent to a pending German prose-
Clition related to the same fraudulent transactions. The German case involved 
the prosecution of someone other than the witness. Moreover, the request was 
accompanied by a letter from the German Consulate General stating that the 
witness neither could nor would be prosecuted in Germany .I! H 
The letter offering immunity was based on the German prosecutor's interpre-
tation of the applicable West German statute of limitations.!H' The U.S. court 
undertook an exhaustive examination of West German law and determined that 
the statutes of limitations had not yet run on several offenses for which the 
Germans could still prosecute the witness.12o The court found the promise of 
immunity to be worthless because of West Germany's rule of compulsory prose-
cution.!2! Cnder that rule, a prosecutor must prosecute all actionable offenses 
for which sufficient f~lctual bases exist.!22 Furthermore, if the prosecutor fails in 
this duty, the \'ictims of the given crime may compel prosecution.1 2 " Noting that 
approximately 600 victims of the alleged securities scheme resided in West 
Germany alone, the court found a "substantial risk" of prosecution and denied 
the Section 1782 request.!24 
By replacing Section 1785 with the new language of Section 1782/ 25 Congress 
also extended a witness' assert able privileges to "all [of those privileges] to which 
115. 448 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978). 
116. Paragraph 55 of the West German Code of Civil Procedure is "comparahle to (the) U.S. Fifth 
Amendment but appl[ies] also if a dependent of the witness would be jeopardized." [d. at 787. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. According to the Germany court. \Vest German law contains no immunity procedures compara-
ble to those of the United States. [d. at 788. 
120. [d. at 789. 
121. STPO sec. 152 (II), quoted in id. at 788. 
122. 448 F. Supp. at 788. For a detailed discussion of Germany's rule of compulsory prosecution, see 
J H. LANGBEIN. COMPARATIVE CRIMI"AL PROCEDURE: GERMA"Y 87-109 (1977). 
123. 448 F. Supp. at 788. 
124. !d. at 788-89. The Germany court cited the United States Supreme Court decision of Zicarelli v. 
New Jersey Investigation Commission. 406 C.S. 472 (1972). where the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment protects against only real dangers of incrimination, "not rerllote and speculative pos-
sibilities." Germany, 448 F. Supp. at 788. In dicta the Germany court said that it would also not be likely to 
compel evidence-giving because of the risk that the witness would be prosecuted for perjury. The witness 
had pled not guilty at his trial. was convicted and, if he were now to say truthfully that he did not know 
the securities were worthless, he would be immediately exposed to such an indictment. [d. at 789-90. 
125. See notes 106-107 and accompanying text supra. 
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[he] may be entitled, including privileges recognized by foreign law."126 Con-
gress purposely made no specific reference to any particular privilege, thereby 
leaving that issue to be clarified by case law, rule or statute. 127 One writer has 
argued that the recognized Section 1782 privileges should not be more extensive 
than those recognized under other American law. 12R At the same time, however, 
such privileges should not be any less extensive.129 It seems that Congress 
intended to balance these objectives when it stated that the judiciary should 
"achieve equitable accommodation of the witness' interests" under Section 
1782.130 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 1782, amended by Congress in an effort "to improve [the] practices of 
international cooperation in litigation,"131 was necessitated by growing U.S. 
involvement in international transactions. This Comment has analyzed the ex-
tent to which Congress intended to liberalize access to Section 1782 judicial 
assistance and has examined the response of U.S. courts to that policy. This 
analysis demonstrates that the Congressional intent behind the 1964 amendment 
to Section 1782 is ambiguous, particularly with respect to interpretation of the 
term "tribuna!''' As a result, recent cases reaching that issue have been inconsis-
tent in both reasoning and result. This Comment suggests that the solution to the 
confusion in that area may be in interpreting "for use" to mean "for intended or 
actual use." 
Congress granted the courts judicial discretion to decide whether to enforce 
letters rogatory or to alter the methods by which evidence is taken under 
Section 1782. In so doing, Congress provided foreign nations and nationals with 
126. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 1033. 
127. Id. During the enactment of the 1964 amendment to § 1782, the yet unfinalized Federal Rules of 
Evidence were under consideration and Congress did not wish to interfere with their development. See 
Smit, supra note 70, at 1034. 
128. Smit, supra note 70, at 1033. 
129. The Sixth Circuit, for example, practically disregarded a criminal defendant's claim that his 
sixth amendment right of confrontation was being denied, in In re Letter Rogatory from the Justice 
Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 383 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 
1975). The case involved a Canadian prosecutor who attempted to obtain certain American bank 
records, about the defendant, for a Canadian prosecution. The defendant argued that the prosecutor 
did not intend to allow him to cross-examine the witness. 383 F. Supp. at 858. Both the district and 
appeals courts denied the defendant's motion to quash the § 1782 order to produce the records. The 
district court admitted an ignorance of Canadian procedures, but would not "assume that such rights 
will receive no protection under [those] procedures." Id. at 859. The appeals court held the claimed 
privilege to be "nothing more than the bald assertion of potential harm." 523 F.2d at 566. This 
summary ruling presents a stark contrast to the Germany court's in-depth examination of West German 
law. See notes 115-24 and accompanying text supra. 
130. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 6, at 3792. 
131. Id. at 3783. 
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a flexible tool for evidence-gathering in the United States. Should the "tribunal" 
issue be resolved in favor of assisting foreign prosecutors during pre-pros-
ecution investigations, more situations will likely arise in which courts will 
have the opportunity to examine the appropriateness of assisting various foreign 
tribunals. 
However, expanded use of Section 1782 will require that U.S. courts place 
correspondingly greater attention upon the privileges claimed by Section 1782 
witnesses. In the Germany case, the court agreed with this view, determining that 
Congress, in enabling foreign and international legal practitioners to reach 
evidence through the United States courts, did not intend to ignore the estab-
lished rights which make this nation so unique. 
Morris H. Deutsch 
